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Abstract—Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) needs to be both
efficient and robust for practical uses. Quantization and structure
simplification are promising ways to adapt DNNs to mobile
devices, and adversarial training is the most popular method
to make DNNs robust. In this work, we try to obtain both
features by applying a convergent relaxation quantization algo-
rithm, Binary-Relax (BR), to a robust adversarial-trained model,
ResNets Ensemble via Feynman-Kac Formalism (EnResNet). We
also discover that high precision, such as ternary (tnn) and 4-bit,
quantization will produce sparse DNNs. However, this sparsity is
unstructured under advarsarial training. To solve the problems
that adversarial training jeopardizes DNNs’ accuracy on clean
images and the struture of sparsity, we design a trade-off loss
function that helps DNNs preserve their natural accuracy and
improve the channel sparsity. With our trade-off loss function,
we achieve both goals with no reduction of resistance under weak
attacks and very minor reduction of resistance under strong
attcks. Together with quantized EnResNet with trade-off loss
function, we provide robust models that have high efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) has achieved significant
success in computer vision. Especially, the residual network
(ResNet)[9] has state-of-the-art performance on image clas-
sification and has become one of the most important Neural
Network architecture in current literature. Despite the large
success of CNN, researchers still try to strength two properties
of DNNs, robustness and efficiency. Robustness keeps the
model accurate under small perturbation of input images, and
efficiency can fit DNNs into embedded system, such as smart-
phone. Many defensive methods [17], [8], [13], [28] have been
invented to increase the robustness of Neural Network. Among
them, Projected Gradient Decent (PGD) [17] training is one of
the most effective and powerful method. Meanwhile, several
attack methods [7], [3], [1], [2] are proposed to examine the
robustness of models. Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
and iterative FGSM [7] are amongst widely used to test
the robustness of models by researchers. On the other hand,
quantization [5], [19], producing models with low-precision
weights, and structured simplification, such as channel pruning
[10], [29], are promising ways to make models efficient. Both
methods above can significantly accelerate DNNs and reduce
the memory sources required
B. Our Contributions
Based on related works, we study the robustness of binary
models under PGD training. We try to find the possibility to
Fig. 1: First row: the original image labeled with the classification
of a ResNet56 and its confidence level. Second row: the perturbation
(noise) generated by FGSM labeled with the classification of the
model and its confidence level
meet both robustness and efficiency, as well as the balance of
natural accuracy and robust accuracy. Our work involves in
both experimental investigation and theoretical analysis.
• Experimentally, we find that EnResNet is able to maintain
high robustness with binary weights. We also show that
the model trained by Binary-Relax [27] algorithm has
better natural accuracy and robust accuracy than that
trained by traditional Binary-Connect (BC) [5] algorithm.
• We make an improvement on the trade-off loss function
initially proposed by [28], which increases both natural
accuracy and robust accuracy. We also provide theory that
can potentially explain why the improved trade-off loss
function performs better.
• We discover that high precision quantization produces
sparse DNNs. We also investigate the structure of the
sparsity and provide a method to produce quantized
robust models with structured sparsity that can be further
simplified by channel pruning.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Binary Quantization
Based on BC, [27] proposed a improvement of BC called
Binary-Relax, which makes the weights converge to binary
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2from float gradually. Theoretically, [27] provided the conver-
gence analysis of BC, and [14] presented an ergodic error
bound of BC. The space of m-bit quantized weights Q ⊂ Rn
is a union of disjoint one-dimensional subspace of Rn.
Q = R+ × {±q1, · · · ,±qm}n =
p⊔
l=1
Al
We minimize our object function in the subspace Q. Hence,
the problem of binarizing weights can be formulated in two
equivalent forms:
argmin
u∈Q
L(u)
argmin
u∈Rn
L(u) + χQ(u) where χQ(u) =
{
0 u ∈ Q
∞ else (1)
Based on the alternative form, [27] relaxed the optimization
problem to:
argmin
u∈Rn
L(u) + λ
2
dist(u,Q)2 (2)
Observing (2) converges to (1) pointwise as λ → ∞, [27]
proposed a relaxation of BC:{
wk+1 = wk − γ∇Lk(uk)
uk+1 = argminu∈Rn
1
2‖wk+1 − u‖+ λ2 dist(u,Q)2
where the second step is solved in closed form:
uk+1 = argmin
u∈Rn
1
2
‖wk+1 − u‖+ λ
2
dist(u,Q)2
=
λprojQ(wk+1) + wk+1
λ+ 1
Algorithm 1 Binary-Relax quantization algorithm
1: Input: mini-batches {(x1,y1), · · · (xm,ym)}, λ0 = 1,
growth rate ρ > 1, learning rate γ, initial float weight
w0, initial binary weight u0 = w0, cut-off epoch M
2: Output: a sequence of binary weights {ut}
3: for t = 1, · · · , N do . N is the number of epochs
4: if t < M then
5: for k = 1, · · · ,m do
6: wt = wt−1 − γt∇kL(ut−1)
7: ut =
λt·ProjQ(wt)+wt
λt+1
8: λt+1 = ρ · λt
9: else
10: for k = 1, · · · ,m do
11: wt = wt−1 − γt∇L(ut−1)
12: ut = ProjQ(wt) . This is precisely
Binary-Connect
13: return quantized weights uN
B. Adversarial Attacks
As [21] discovered the limited continuity of DNNs’ input-
output mapping, the outputs of DNNs can be changed by
adding fairly small perturbations to input data. The methods
that generate perturbed data are adversarial attacks, and the
generated perturbed data are called adversarial examples. Here
we introduce three adversarial attacks:
1) Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM):
Given a specific magnitude of perturbation , FGSM
searches adversarial examples by perturb the input data
towards gradient of loss function.
x′ = x+  · ∇wL(f(w, x), y)
2) Iterative FGSM (IFGSM) Given a iteration number n,
step size α, and a magnitude , IFGSM generates adver-
sarial examples by perturb the data towards the gradient
of loss function iteratively and threshold the perturbation.
x(n) = xn−1 + α∇wL(f(w, x(n−1)), y)
for n = 1, · · · , n, and x(0) = x. Then,
x′ = x+ Clip(x
(n))
3) Carlini and Wagner method (C&W): C&W method pro-
vides adversarial examples by solving the problem
min
δ
||δ|| s.t. f(w, x+ δ) = t
for a target label t. While Carlini and Wagner originally
proposed the metric || · || to be l2, most researchers use
l∞ instead. In our study, we also use l∞ for C&W attack.
Among these 3 adversarial attacks, IFGSM is the strongest
attack. IFGSM can make a ResNet56 with natural training
predict all test data of Cifar10 wrong with confidence level
at least 99.3% over all test images. C&W can reduce the test
accuracy of ResNet56 on Cifar10 from 92% to 5.12%, and
FGSM reduces the accuracy to 17.26%. While there are many
more adversarial attack methods [12], [15], methods above are
computationally efficient and are the most popular methods
used to examine the robustness of models.
C. Adversarial Training
Adversarial training [1], [17] generates perturbed input data
and train the model to stay stable under adversarial examples.
It has object function:
min
w
L(w) = 1
N
N∑
n=1
max
x˜n∈Dn
l(f(w, x˜n), yn) (3)
where Dn = {x|‖x − xn‖∞ < δ}. l and f are the loss
function and the DNN respectively. A widely used method
to pratically find x˜n is PGD [17]. [28] shows that adversarial
training with PGD is, in general, more powerful than other
methods such as gradient mask and gradient regularization
[13]. [20] investigated the properties of the object function of
adversarial training, and [25] provided convergence analysis
of adversarial training based on the previous.
3Feynman-Kac formalism principled Robust DNNs: Neu-
ral ordinary differential equations (ODEs) [4] are a class of
DNNs that use an ODE to describe the data flow of each input
data. Instead of focusing on modeling the data flow of each
individual input data, [24], [23], [16] use a transport equation
(TE) to model the flow for the whole input distribution.
In particular, from the TE viewpoint, [24] modeled training
ResNet [9] as finding the optimal control of the following TE
∂u
∂t (x, t) +G(x,w(t)) · ∇u(x, t) = 0, x ∈ Rd,
u(x, 1) = g(x), x ∈ Rd,
u(xi, 0) = yi, xi ∈ T, with T being the training set.
(4)
where G(x,w(t)) encodes the architecture and weights of the
underlying ResNet, u(x, 0) serves as the classifier, g(x) is the
output activation of ResNet, and yi is the label of xi.
[24] interpreted adversarial vulnerability of ResNet as aris-
ing from the irregularity of u(x, 0) of the above TE. To
enhance u(x, 0)’s regularity, they added a diffusion term,
1
2σ
2∆u(x, t), to the governing equation of (4) which resulting
in the convection-diffusion equation (CDE). By the Feynman-
Kac formula, u(x, 0) of the CDE can be approximated by the
following two steps:
• Modify ResNet by injecting Gaussian noise to each residual
mapping.
• Average the output of n jointly trained modified ResNets,
and denote it as EnnResNet.
[24] have noticed that EnResNet can improve both natural and
robust accuracies of the AT DNNs. In this work, we leverage
the sparsity advantage of EnResNet to push the sparsity limit
of the AT DNNs.
III. QUANTIZATION OF ENRESNET
We know that the accuracy of a quantized model will be
lower than its float equivalent because of loss of precision.
However, we want to know that whether a quantized model
is more vulnerable than its float equivalent under adversarial
attacks? In this section, we study this question by comparing
the accuracy drops of the natural accuracy and robust accuracy
from float weights to binary weights. Meanwhile, we also in-
vestigate the performances between two quantization methods
BC and BR.
A. Experimental Setup
Dataset. We use one of the most popular dataset CIFAR-
10 [11] to evaluate the quantized models, as it would be
convenient to compare it with the float models in [24], [28].
Baseline. For model, our baseline model is the regular ResNet.
Since, as the best of our knowledge, there are no suitable
work done before that investigated the robustness of models
with quantized weights. We mainly look at that how close our
quantized models can be to the float models [24], [28].
Evaluation. We evaluate both natural and robust accuracies
for quantized advarsarial trained models. We examine the
robustness of models by three attack methods, FGSM (A1),
iterative FGSM (A2), and C&W (A3). In our recording, N
denotes the natural accuracy (accuracy on clean images) of
models. For algorithm, we set Binary-connect as our baseline,
we want see that the advantage of the relaxed algorithm 1 in
[27] is preserved under adversarial training. We use the wildly
used binarizing projection proposed by [19], namely:
ProjQ(w) = E[|w|] · sign(w) =
||w||1
n
· sign(w)
where sign(·) is the component-wise sign function and n is
the dimension of weights.
B. Result
First, we see that the quantized models can maintain decent
robustness under the attacks. The drops of the robust accura-
cies are roughly in the same amount as the natural accuracy
(Table I), which indicates that quantization does not make the
model more vulnerable.
Second, we investigate the performances of Binary-Connect
method (BC) and Binary-Relax method (BR). We verify that
BR outperforms BC (Table I). A quantized model trained via
BR provides higher natural accuracy and robust accuracy. As
a consequence, we use this relaxed method to quantize DNNs
in all subsequent experiments in this paper.
Finally, We verify that the EnResNet is more robust com-
net quant N A1 A2 A3
En1ResNet20
float 78.31% 56.64% 49.00% 66.84%
BC 68.84% 46.31% 42.45% 58.52%
BR 69.60% 47.17% 43.89% 58.79%
En2ResNet20
float 80.10% 57.48% 49.55% 66.73%
BC 71.48% 47.83% 43.03% 59.09%
BR 72.58% 49.29% 44.72% 60.36%
En5ResNet20
float 80.64% 58.14% 50.32% 66.96%
BC 75.54% 51.03% 46.01% 60.92%
BR 75.40% 51.60% 46.91% 61.52%
TABLE I: Binary Connect vs Binary Relax
paring to the ResNet with the samiliar number of parameters
under quantization. We train two sets of EnResNet and ResNet
with adversarial training. As shown in table II, EnResNet
has much higher robust accuracy for both float and quantized
models. We also study the behavior of quantized models under
black-box attacks. Suppose we have a target model and a ora-
cle model. We test a quantized target network by three different
blind attacks. The oracle models are the float equivalent of the
target model, a quantized model with different architecture (to
the target model), and a float model with different architecture
respectively. The results are in Table III. We observe that
accuracies of models are improved significantly comparing
those of white-box attack.
net(#params) model N A1 A2 A3
En1ResNet20(0.27M)
float 78.31% 56.61% 49.00% 66.84%
br 69.60% 47.17% 43.89% 58.79%
ResNet20(0.27M) float 76.30% 51.19% 46.72% 57.90%br 66.81% 43.37% 40.72% 52.14%
En2ResNet20(0.54M)
float 80.10% 57.48% 49.36% 66.73%
br 72.58% 49.29% 44.72% 60.36%
ResNet34(0.56M) float 77.82% 54.05% 49.89% 61.38%br 70.31% 46.42% 43.26% 54.75%
TABLE II: Ensemble ResNet vs ResNets
4Target Oracle A1 A2 A3
En2ResNet20 En2ResNet20 Float 59.88% 55.65% 66.06%
En2ResNet20 En3ResNet20 Binary 55.18% 52.74% 65.82%
En2ResNet20 En3ResNet20 Float 59.58% 55.59% 65.83%
En5ResNet20 En5ResNet20 Float 61.30% 57.05% 68.14%
En5ResNet20 En1ResNet20 Binary 58.96% 56.54% 68.14%
En5ResNet20 En1ResNet20 Float 61.58% 57.72% 69.82%
TABLE III: Robustness of binarized models under Black Box Attack
C. Adaptation of Existing analysis of BC to adversarial train-
ing
Researchers have established quite a few theoretical on
stability of training binary DNNs and error bounds of binary
DNNs. We remark that these theoretical analysis of quanti-
zation under natural training can be adapted to adversarial
training.
We use short-hand h(w, xn) for maxx˜n∈Dn l(f(w, x˜n), yn).
Consequently, we rewrite (3) more concisely as:
min
w
L(w) = 1
N
N∑
n=1
h(w, xn)
We first introduce a few common assumptions used in
analysis of DNNs.
Assumptions:
1) h is Lipschitz differentiable in both arguments. i.e. ∃C >
0 s.t.
supx ‖∇wh(w1, x)−∇wh(w2, x)‖ ≤ C‖w1 − w2‖
supw ‖∇wh(w, x1)−∇wh(w, x2)‖ ≤ C‖x1 − x2‖
supx ‖∇xh(w1, x)−∇xh(w2, x)‖ ≤ C‖w1 − w2‖
2) The variance of the stochastic gradients is bounded. i.e.
E[‖∇L(w)−∇Lk(w)‖2] ≤ σ2, ∀k ∈ N, where ∇Lk(w)
is the sampled mini-batch gradient at k-th epoch.
3) h(w, x) is locally strongly concave in x in all Dn. That
is, ∃µ > 0 s.t. ∀n and x1, x2 ∈ Dn, we have
h(w, x1) ≥ h(w, x2) + 〈∇xh(w, x2), x1− x2〉− µ2 ‖x1−
x2‖2
Lipschitz differentiable and bounded variance of stochastic
gradients are common assumptions [27], [14], [25], [20]
made for analysis of gradient descent. Assumption 3, made
according to [20], [25], is the additional assumption to adapt
the situation to robust training.
Lemma 1 (lemma 1 in [25]). Under assumption 1 and 3, we
have L is L-Lipschitz differentiable
‖∇L(w1)−∇L(w2)‖ ≤ L‖w1 − w2‖
then consequently,
L(w1) ≤ L(w2) + 〈∇L(w2), w1 − w2〉+ L
2
‖w1 − w2‖2
where L = C
2
µ + C
Lemma 1 shows that if the original loss function is Lips-
chitz differentiable, with a few additional conditions, the loss
function of adversarial training is also Lipschitz differentiable.
This result allows us to extend many existing analysis of
Fig. 2: Maximum of Binary Weights under l1 norm
against epochs
quantization to adversarial training. In particular, the following
theorem provided by [14] holds for adversarial training.
Theorem 1 (Theorem 3 in [14]). Let w∗ = argminw∈Rn L(w)
and learning rate γt = 1t . Assume that the domain of L
is bounded with diameter D. L is convex and satisfies the
assumptions 1,2 and 3, then the ergodic error satisfies
lim
T→∞
E[L(w¯T )− L(w∗)] ≤ 2
√
nMLD
where w¯T = 1T
∑T
t=1 wt, L and M are the constants in Lemma
1 and lim supt E[|wt|] respectively, and n is the dimension of
the domain.
Network M
En1ResNet20 0.2762
En2ResNet20 0.2399
En3ResNet20 0.2065
En5ResNet20 0.1819
TABLE IV: the uniform bound M
One drawback of this theorem is that whether M is bounded
or not remains unknown to us. Therefore, we numerically
investigate the values of M , and we uncover an interesting
feature of ensemble ResNet. Let Wt be collection of convo-
lutional layers of the neural network at epoch t. Define
Mt = max
w∈Wt
E(|w|), M = max
1≤t≤T
w∈Wt
E(|w|) = max
1≤t≤T
Mt
Since we train each model 200 epochs, we have T = 200
here. We find that M is numerically bounded (as in Fig.
2) and small. Moreover, the value of M decreases as the
number of ensembles increases (Table IV). In other words,
the bound provided by theorem 1 is tighter when the number
of ensembles is larger. From Table 3, we see that, for both
quantized and float model the kernels have the smaller
weights for the larger number of ensembels. A pervious work
that studied the sparsity of EnResNet [6] also found a similar
result that the weights of EnResNet are smaller for a larger
number of ensembles. Theorem 1 offers an explanation that
how this feature of EnResNet can favor its performance.
5Fig. 3: Visualizations of float and quantized kernels: left-hand side
columns are randomly selected kernels of quantized models, and the
right-hand columns are the same kernels of float models
IV. TRADE-OFF BETWEEN ROBUST ACCURACY AND
NATURAL ACCURACY
A. Previous work and our methodology
It is known that adversarial training will decrease the
accuracy for clean input data. This phenomenon is verified
both theoretically [22] and experimentally [28], [24], [13]
by researchers. [28] proposed a trade of loss function for
robust training to balance the adversarial accuracy and natural
accuracy. It formulated as following:
L = Lnat + β · 1
N
N∑
n=1
l
(
f(xn), f(x˜n)
)
(5)
Motivated by [28], we study the following trade-off loss
function for our quantized models:
L = α · Lnat + β·Lrob (6)
Note that adversarial training is a special case α = 0, β = 1
in (6).
B. Experiment and result
To compare the performances of two loss functions, we
fix our network and dataset to be En1ResNet20 and CIFAR-
10. Based on [28], who studied β of (5) in the range [1, 10],
we set the trade-off parameter β ∈ [1, 4, 8] to emphasize the
robustness in different levels.
The experiment results are in Table V. We observe that, when
the natural loss and the adversarial loss are equally treated, (5)
focuses on the natural accuracy while (6) favors on the robust
accuracy. As the trade-off parameter β increases, (5) trades
quite amount of natural loss for robustness, while (6) trades
a relatively small amount of natural loss for robustness. In
another word, we find that (6) has better trade-off efficiency.
Hence, we say that the loss function (6) outperforms (5).
C. Analysis of trade-off functions
Let us consider the binary classification case, where have
our samples (x, y) ∈ X × {−1, 1}. Let f : X → R be a clas-
sifier and σ(·) be an activation function. Then our prediction
for a sample is yˆ = sign(f(x)) and the corresponding socre
is σ(f(x)). Above is the theoretical setting provided by [28].
Then, we have the errors Rφ(f) and R∗φ(f) corresponding to
(5) and (6) respectively, considering α = β = 1 for both loss
functions:
Rφ(f) = E[φ(σ ◦ f(x) · y)] + E[φ(σ ◦ f(x) · σ ◦ f(x′))]
R∗φ(f) = E[φ(σ ◦ f(x) · y)] + E[φ(σ ◦ f(x′) · y)]
We first consider the simple case that φ is the 0-1 loss function.
Then, we don’t need a activation function in this case so we
take σ(θ) = θ.
Proposition 1. Let φ be the 0-1 loss function and activation
function be the identity map. Then,
Rφ(f) ≤ R∗φ(f)
Proof: We first define a set E:
E = {x|f(x)y < 0, f(x′)y > 0}
By the definition of adversarial examples in (3),
E[1{E}] = 0
where 1{E} is the indicator function of the set. That is, the set
that the classifier predicts original data point wrong but the
perturbed data point correctly should have measure 0. Now,
we define the following sets:
B = {x|f(x)y ≥ 0, f(x′)y ≥ 0}
D = {x|f(x)y ≥ 0, f(x′)y < 0}
F = {x|f(x)y < 0, f(x′)y < 0}
We note that
{∃x′ ∈ B(x, δ) f(x′)f(x) ≤ 0)} = D ∪ E
{∃x′ ∈ B(x, δ) f(x′)y ≤ 0} = D ∪ F
Then
E[1{∃x′ ∈ B(x, δ) f(x′)f(x) ≤ 0)}] = E[1{D}]
≤ E[1{D}+ 1{F}] = E[1{∃x′ ∈ B(x, δ) f(x′)y ≤ 0}]
As we consider the naive 0-1 loss, both loss functions have no
penalty on set B. Therefore, we have
Rφ(f) = E[1{f(x)y ≤ 0}+1{∃x′ ∈ B(x, δ) f(x′)f(x) ≤ 0)}]
≤ E[1{f(x)y ≤ 0}+1{∃x′ ∈ B(x, δ) f(x′)y ≤ 0}] = R∗φ(f)

The underlying message behind these results is that under
the same classifier, loss function and activation function,
R∗φ(f) captures more errors than R∗φ(f), as the later fails
to capture the robust error when the natural prediction is
incorrect.
6Net Loss N A1 A2 A3
En1ResNet20 (5) (β = 1) 84.49% 45.96% 34.81% 51.94%
En1ResNet20 (6) (α = 1, β = 1) 83.47% 54.46% 43.86% 64.04%
En1ResNet20 (5) (β = 4) 80.05% 51.24% 45.43% 58.85%
En1ResNet20 (6) (α = 1, β = 4) 80.91% 55.92% 47.77% 66.53%
En1ResNet20 (5) (β = 8) 75.82% 51.63% 46.95% 59.31%
En1ResNet20 (6) (α = 1, β = 8) 79.31% 56.28% 47.82% 66.07%
TABLE V: Comparison of Loss Function
The same result also holds in more general cases. Now,
we consider several common loss functions: the hinge loss
(φ(θ) = max{1−θ, 0}), the sigmoid loss (φ(θ) = 1−tanh θ),
and the logistic loss (φ(θ) = log2(1 + e
−θ)). Note that we
want a loss function to be monotonic deceasing in [−1, 1] as
−1 indicates completely wrong and 1 indicates completely
correct. Since our classes is 1 and -1, we will choose
hyperbolic tangent as our activation function.
Proposition 2. Let φ be any loss function that is monotonic
decreasing on [−1, 1] (all loss functions mentioned above
satisfy this), and σ(θ) = tanh θ. Define B = {x|f(x)y ≥
0, f(x′)y ≥ 0} as in proposition 1. Then:
Rφ(f) ≥ R∗φ(f) on B and Rφ(f) ≤ R∗φ(f) on BC
Proof: Let E, D, and F be the sets defined in proposition 1.
We note that the activation function σ(x) preserves the sign
of x, and |σ(x)| ≤ 1.
On the set B, f(x), f(x′), and y have the same sign, so are
σ(f(x)), σ(f(x′)) and y. Therefore
φ(σ(f(x′)) · σ(f(x)) ≥ φ(σ(f(x′) · y)
as 0 ≤ σ(f(x′)) · σ(f(x)) ≤ σ(f(x′)) · y. This shows
Rφ(f) ≥ R∗φ(f) on B
We note that BC = E∪D∪F . Since set E has measure zero,
we only consider D and F .
On D, as f classifies x correct and x′ wrong, we have
σ(f(x′)) · y ≤ σ(f(x′)) · σ(f(x)) ≤ 0
⇒ φ(σ(f(x′)) · σ(f(x)) ≤ φ(σ(f(x′) · y)
On F , as f classifies both x and x′ wrong, we have
σ(f(x′)) · y ≤ 0 ≤ σ(f(x′)) · σ(f(x))
⇒ φ(σ(f(x′)) · σ(f(x)) ≤ φ(σ(f(x′) · y)
In summary, we have
Rφ(f) ≤ R∗φ(f) on BC

In the more general case of proposition 2, we partition our
space into several sets based on a given classifier f , and we
examine the actions of loss functions on those sets. We see that
(5) penalize set B heavier than (6), but the classifier classifies
both the natural data and the perturbed data correct on B. On
the other hand, (5) does not penalize sets E and F , where
the classifier makes mistakes, enough, especially on set F .
Therefore, (6) as a loss function is more on target. Based on
both experimental results and theoretical analysis, we believe
(6) is a better choice to balance natural accuracy and robust
accuracy.
As our experiment on the balance of accuracies with different
parameters in our loss function (6) in table VI. We find that it
is possible to increase the natural accuracy while maintaining
the robustness under relatively weak attacks (FGSM & CW),
as the case of α = 1 and β = 8 in table VI. However,
the resistance under relatively strong attack (IFGSM) will
inevitably decrease when we trade-off.
net loss N A1 A2 A3
En1ResNet20 α = 0, β = 1 69.60% 47.81% 43.89% 58.79%
En1ResNet20 α = 1, β = 4 73.40% 47.41% 41.86% 57.83%
En1ResNet20 α = 1, β = 8 71.35% 47.42% 42.46% 59.01%
En2ResNet20 α = 0, β = 1 71.58% 49.29% 44.62% 60.36%
En2ResNet20 α = 1, β = 4 75.92% 48.97% 43.41% 59.40%
En2ResNet20 α = 1, β = 8 74.72% 49.66% 43.96% 60.65%
En5ResNet20 α = 0, β = 1 75.40% 51.60% 46.91% 61.52%
En5ResNet20 α = 1, β = 4 78.50% 50.85% 45.02% 60.96%
En5ResNet20 α = 1, β = 8 77.35% 51.62% 45.63% 61.11%
TABLE VI: Trade-off loss function for quantized models
V. FURTHER BALANCE OF EFFICIENCY AND ROBUSTNESS:
STRUCTURED SPARSE QUANTIZED NEURAL NETWORK VIA
TERNARY/4-BIT QUANTIZATION AND TRADE-OFF LOSS
FUNCTION
A. Sparse neural network delivered by high precision quanti-
zation
If we quantize DNNs with higher precision than binary
quantization, such as ternery and 4-bit quantization. Then,
the quantized weights are allowed to be 0. In fact, we find
that a large proportion of weights will be 0 for quantized
models. This suggests that a ternary or 4-bit quantized model
can be further simplified via channel pruning. However, such
simplification requires structure sparsity of DNN architecture.
In our study, we use the algorithm 1 as before with the
projection replaced by ternary and 4-bit respectively. As
shown in Table VII, we find that sparsity of quantized DNNs
under regular training are significantly more structured than
those under adversarial training. For both ternary(tnn) and 4-
bit quantization, quantized models with adversarial training
have very unstructured sparsity, while models with natural
training have much more structured sparsity. We verify this
phenomenon for both ResNet20, En1ResNet20, ResNet56, and
En1ResNet56. For example, 50.71% (0.135M out of 0.268M)
of weights in convolutional layers are 0 in a ternary quantized
ResNet20, but there are only 2.55% (16 out of 627) channels
are 0. If the sparsity is unstructured, it is useless for model
7Fig. 4: Visualization of 4 ternary channels (reshaped for visualization) of a layer in ResNet20 under AT. The green areas are 0 weights.
Fig. 5: Visualization of 4 ternary channels (reshaped for visulization) of a layer in En1ResNet56 under natural training. There are less 0
weights in non-sparse channels.
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Fig. 6: Comparison of Adversarial training (AT) with trade-off loss: the left-hand side are original plots of channels, and we isolate the zero
weights and nonzero weights of the left-hand side channels for better visualization in right-hand side. The dark parts are zero weights and
the yellow parts are nonzero weights
simplication as channel pruning cannot be applied. A fix to
this problem is our trade-off loss function, as factor nautral
loss into adversarial training should improve the structure of
sparsity. Our experiment (Table VII) shows that a small factor
of natural loss, α = 1 and β in (6), can push the sparsity
to be more structured. Meanwhile, the deepness of models
also has an impact on the structure of sparsity. The deeper
the more structured the sparsity is. We see in Table VII that,
under the same setting, the structure of sparsity increases as the
model becomes deeper. Also, En5ResNet20 and En2ResNet56
(with trade-off loss) in Table VIII have much more channel
sparsity than En1ResNet20 and En1ResNet56 (with trade-off
loss) respectively. Figure 4 and figure and figure 5, shows
the difference between a unstructured sparsity of a ternary
ResNet20 with adversarial training and a much more struc-
tured sparsity of ResNet56 with natural training.
B. Further study and generalization
Based on previous discussions, together with quantization
and our trade-off loss function, we can produce very efficient
DNN models with high robustness. The trade-off function not
only improves the natural accuracy of models with minor
harm to robustness but also structure the sparsity of high
precision quantization, so further simplification of models can
be done through channel pruning. Now, we want to generalize
our result to more datasets. We verify that the performance
of the quantized model with our trade-off loss function can
be generalize to other popular datasets, including Cifar 100
[11], MNIST, Fashion MNIST (FMNIST) [26], and SVHN
[18]. Among these datasets, MNIST and Fashion-MNIST are
digital images with only one channel, i.e. black-and-white,
and, therefore, are much easier to learn than CIFAR10. The
Street View House Numbers(SVHN) datasets are images with
three RGB channels, color digital images, like CIFAR10. In
our experiments, we learn SVHN dataset without utilizing
its extra training data. As Fashion-MNIST and SVHN are
somewhat less popular than MNIST and CIRFAR10, we
visualize each dataset with a mini-batch in Figure(7). Last,
we test our quantized model on a large dataset CIFAR100,
which contains 100 classes with 600 images per class. Our
9Net Quant Loss Weight Sparsity Channel Sparsity N A1 A2
ResNet20 tnn Natural 53.00% 11.16% 90.54% 12.71% 0.00%
En1ResNet20 tnn Natural 52.19% 9.57% 90.61% 26.21% 0.71%
ResNet20 tnn AT 50.71% 2.55% 68.30% 44.80% 42.53%
En1ResNet20 tnn AT 50.31% 4.14% 71.30% 48.17% 43.27%
En1ResNet20 tnn (6) 55.66% 7.02% 73.05% 48.10% 42.65%
ResNet20 4-bit Natural 42.79% 9.53% 91.75% 12.38% 0.00%
En1ResNet20 4-bit Natural 44.73% 10.52% 91.42% 27.99% 0.62%
ResNet20 4-bit AT 43.93% 2.55% 71.49% 47.63% 44.08%
En1ResNet20 4-bit AT 48.35% 4.94% 73.05% 51.43% 45.10%
En1ResNet20 4-bit (6) 55.57% 7.42% 76.61% 51.92% 44.39%
ResNet56 tnn Natural 60.96% 31.86% 91.91% 15.58% 0.00%
En1ResNet56 tnn Natural 60.66% 28.97% 91.46% 38.22% 0.36%
ResNet56 tnn AT 54.21% 15.37% 74.56% 51.73% 46.62%
En1ResNet56 tnn AT 54.70% 16.74% 76.87% 53.16% 47.89%
En1ResNet56 tnn (6) 58.89% 21.36% 77.24% 52.96% 46.01%
ResNet56 4-bit Natural 67.94% 39.16% 93.09% 16.02% 0.00%
En1ResNet56 4-bit Natural 71.07% 41.10% 92.39% 39.79% 0.33%
ResNet56 4-bit AT 55.29% 17.10% 77.67% 52.43% 48.22%
En1ResNet56 4-bit AT 55.09% 18.11% 78.25% 55.48% 49.03%
En1ResNet56 4-bit (6) 67.31% 33.18% 79.44% 55.41% 47.80%
TABLE VII: Sparsity and structure of sparsity of quantized models. We use α = 1 and β = 8 in trade-off loss (6)
(a) SVHN
(b) Fashion-MNIST
Fig. 7: a mini-batch of SVHN dataset and a mini-batch of Fashion-
MNIST dataset
results are displayed in Table VIII. We find that binary models
are almost as good as the float models on the small datasets
MNIST and Fashion MNIST. Unfortunately, binary models do
not do well in large difficult datasets like SVNH and Cifar100,
but 4-bit quantized models have comparable performances
as float ones. Although 4-bit quantization requires higher
precision, the highly structured sparsity can quite compensate
the efficiency of models.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the robustness of quantized models.
The experimental results suggest that quantized models are not
more vulnerable under adversarial attacks, and a well-designed
trade-off function can increase the natural accuracy of a model
with minor reduction of robustness. Moreover, we discover
that high precision quantization can offer sparse DNNs, and
a trade-off function can make this sparsity structured. By
combining a powerful robust model, EnResNet, and our trade-
off loss function, we find that keeping a model both efficient
and robust is promising and worth paying attention to. We
hope our study can serve as a benchmark for future studies on
this interesting topic.
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